Egon Bahr. Der deutsche Weg: Selbstverständlich und normal. München: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2003. 157 S. EUR 12.00 (broschiert), ISBN 978-3-89667-244-5.

Reviewed by Douglas Peifer (Department of International Security and Military Studies, Air Command and Staff College)
Published on H-German (July, 2004)

[Disclaimer: The views expressed in this review are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.]

In his latest essay, Egon Bahr elaborates and develops a number of ideas that he advanced even before the Iraq controversy of 2002-2003 stimulated intense German public interest in power politics, the global order, and German-American relations. Bahr revisits the themes of German interests (see Deutsche Interessen: Streitschrift zu Macht, Sicherheit und Aussenpolitik [1998]) and the German nation-state (see Der Nationalstaat, überlebt und unentbehrlich [1999]), arguing that if nothing else, the Iraq War underlined the necessity of redefining Germany's interests and examining its international role. Bahr, who played a key role in developing and implementing Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, is pleased that one can again discuss German interests and German foreign policies openly, contending that Germany must shoulder its responsibilities in shaping a European foreign and security policy. While the German past is indeed full of terrible mistakes, Bahr urges Germans to find the courage to overcome their fixation with their past in order to help build a better European future.

Bahr's essay speaks from the heart, reflecting a German nationalist strain in SPD thinking, tracing back to Kurt Schumacher and the pre-Gödesberg era. Bahr sets the stage for his argument with an anecdotal chapter sharing recollections from his past. The reader catches glimpses of Bahr interacting with politicians, intellectuals, and scientists on both the domestic and international stage, with the roster of persona ranging from Jacob Kaiser and Willy Brandt to Andrei Gromyko and Richard Perle. Having captured the reader's attention and interest, Bahr then proceeds to develop his case by examining "The German Way," "The American Way," "The European Way," "Europe and America," and "The German Way Forward."

In his chapter "The German Way," Bahr provides a brief overview of the post-World War II German settlement. Bahr contends that the frightening Wilhelmine and Third Reich undertones of a "German Way" need to be relegated to the past. Recalling the immediate post-war period, he asserts that war-weariness pervaded the German public, with Allied re-education efforts reinforcing an already widespread disillusionment with power politics and military solutions. Only with the greatest reluctance did West Germans rearm themselves, and nationalist objections to the special restrictions imposed on the Bundeswehr soon were forgotten as growing prosperity showed the benefits of ceding sovereignty in the areas of security and commerce to NATO and the European Economic Community. Bahr's overall assessment of the Bonn republic is that while West Germans initially may have embrace of the values of a civil, democratic and peace-loving society out of necessity rather than conviction, these values became central to the German identity. Bahr notes that East Germans had little opportunity to internalize democracy under the SED regime, but defends Brandt's Ostpolitik for at least building bridges between the two societies. The "German Way," for Bahr, equates to a commitment to negotiation and dialogue, with cooperation yielding greater benefits than confrontation.

Turning to "The American Way," Bahr purports to present an impartial, detached analysis of U.S. foreign policy free of the emotional anti-Americanism characteristic of current German talk shows, publications, and books. The United States, according to Bahr, seeks nothing short of global domination, with its yearning for ever greater dominance resembling a drug addiction from which one cannot withdraw (p. 63). The German public's dislike of the Bush administration is misplaced: whether under Democratic or Republican administrations, the United States will seek to strengthen its hegemony, much as did Rome or Britain at their heights. Bahr minimizes the significance of domestic U.S. foreign policy differences, presenting instead a picture of broad consensus and cold self-interest in policy formulation and execution. He believes that America's reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was predictable: the independent Commission on America's National Interest and various policy experts had already advocated that the United States should adopt a more assertive, pro-active strategy well before September 11. The Bush administration used the crisis to push forward its plans of pre-emption, multi-level deterrence, and military transformation, with the "War against Terror" serving as a globally acceptable motto under which the United States could pursue its own national interests.

While Bahr depicts the United States as a unitary actor pursuing clearly defined interests in "The American Way," his portrayal of "The European Way" acknowledges differences of opinion within Europe concerning foreign policy formulation. He notes that two visions of Europe jostled against each other over the past fifty years: a British vision of a cooperative Europe where vital questions of security and sovereignty remained the preserve of the nation, and a German vision where the nation-states of Europe gradually ceded these powers to federal European government. Both visions had and have their backers among Europe's other states and people, with the European Union now being more integrated than Britain might have wished but less so than Germany desired. Bahr notes that consensus and agreement will become increasingly difficult as the European Union swells to twenty-five, and while he proposes a number of fixes to make the European Union more effective and manageable, he believes that different visions will most probably result in a two-speed approach to further integration. How the new East European nations react to further integration remains to be seen: Bahr notes that personal freedom and national independence arrived simultaneously in Eastern Europe, and acknowledges Eastern Europeans may be more reluctant to trade their newly acquired national sovereignty in favor of a deepened Europe than Western Europeans.

Having acknowledged the diversity of vision within Europe, Bahr nonetheless contends that Europe should develop a common foreign policy and must commit to an independent European defense force outside the NATO framework. For Bahr, Europe has internalized the "principles of cooperation, of non-violence, of peaceful conflict resolution, of compromise in the pursuit of cooperation, of mutual respect, of achievable progress through consensus" (p. 97). These shared European values must be nurtured through common European positions and policies, with a small but capable European military freeing the European Union from its dependency on the United States.

Bahr's essay culminates in his discussion of "Europe and America." He finds Robert Kagan's analysis of diverging American and European strategic cultures persuasive, echoing Kagan's depiction of a U.S. worldview centered on power and interests, but correcting Kagan's concept of a Europe both unwilling and unable to project power.[1] Instead, Bahr claims that Europe simply has a different conception of power, one that conceives of power through international cooperation, dialogue, and multilateralism. Europe will gain in soft power by adhering to its principles, and presenting an alternative Western model to that of the United States. Bahr cautions his European readers to abandon the desire to act as a counterweight to America, arguing that Europe should not become a balance against the United States but rather present an independent, European vision that need not clash with that of the United States. Here Bahr's analysis is weakest: at one point he argues that Europe must present an alternative Western vision to that of the United States because the European-American "community of values" no longer exists, while elsewhere he contends that the European Way will complement rather than clash with the American Way because both are committed to promoting human worth, freedom, toleration, and pluralism (p. 132). If no community of values remains, then surely European and American foreign policies will clash. If America and Europe still share the same values and goals, then is hope for cooperation and coordination as misplaced as Bahr would have us think?

Bahr concludes his essay by returning to the thesis of a "German Way." He rebuts those who caution against a German Sonderweg after the disasters of the Wilhelmine period and the Nazi era by asserting that "Auschwitz is not a suitable justification for our engagement in Kosovo nor our involvement in Afghanistan" (p. 137). For Bahr, Germans must shed their fixation with the crimes of the past, assume the responsibilities of the present, and steer an independent, self-confident path in the future lest they become the plaything of other powers (p. 139). Germans should capitalize their constitutional restrictions against aggressive war (Article 26) in order to shape a foreign policy centered on international law, environmental protection, Third World assistance, and peace-keeping. Germany should promote these interests and values through Europe, offering the non-Western world a softer alternative to the Western model the United States projects.

The central themes of Der deutsche Weg echo ideas that Bahr has been advancing over the last decades: the need for an independent, self-confident German foreign policy; the necessity for Germany to look forward rather than backward; and the requirement that Europe develop common foreign policies and capabilities that would make it an equal player in the global order to the United States. While Bahr recognizes that European expansion has introduced new challenges to developing a common European foreign and security policy, he remains certain that closer integration is inevitable, with a core group ("Euroland") leading the way. For Bahr, German national interests and European interests are one and the same. Those European nations outside of Bahr's "Euroland" core area may find this conflation disturbing, but it allows Bahr to dress German nationalism in European clothes. As for his foreign policy prescriptions, Bahr is better at articulating his distress at American unilateralism than explaining how Europe will deal with the very real dangers of nuclear proliferation, the confluence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and ethnic cleansing should dialogue and diplomacy prove inadequate. Overall, Bahr's vision will appeal to those who believe that Europe and Germany must develop alternative Western prescriptions to those devised in Washington. Those committed to promoting closer ties and more cooperation across the Atlantic will find Bahr's vision troubling and polemical.

Notes

[1]. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

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Citation: Douglas Peifer. Review of Bahr, Egon, Der deutsche Weg: Selbstverständlich und normal. H-German, H-Net Reviews. July, 2004.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9603

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