Gregor Schöllgen. Der Auftritt: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne. Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2003. 176 S. EUR 18.00 (broschiert), ISBN 978-3-549-07205-9.

Reviewed by Douglas Peifer (Department of International Security and Military Studies, Air Command and Staff College)
Published on H-German (July, 2004)

[Disclaimer: The views expressed in this review are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.]

Gregor Schöllgen's Der Auftritt offers a provocative examination of how and why Germany became the first and most outspoken European state to oppose U.S. Iraq policies in the months preceding the Iraq War. Schöllgen, whose works on German foreign policy and the Brandt administration have been well received, argues that Schröder's opposition to the Bush administration's coercive diplomacy was principled rather than opportunistic, reflecting deep-rooted differences regarding the use of force in international politics. Schröder's critique of America's drift to war resonated with the German public and contributed to Red-Green electoral success, but Schöllgen views this as a byproduct. The true significance of Schröder and Fischer's public, outspoken objections to the Bush administration's Iraq policies was that a German administration finally found the courage to pursue German interests and values when these diverged from Washington's agenda. Schöllgen believes that the development of an independent German foreign policy is natural, inevitable, and long-overdue, reflecting the divergence of German and American interests in the post-Cold War period.

Schöllgen's study of how Germany "returned to the world stage" as an independent actor is concise, readable, and opinionated. The book covers the chronological period 1989-2003, with six short chapters tracing the development of German foreign policy since unification. Schöllgen opens his work by summarizing the international framework for German unification, then turns to German diplomacy within Europe where Germany pushed for "more Europe" to assuage fears of too much Germany. Outside of Europe, Schöllgen outlines how, by the mid-1990s, Germany had shifted from its limited liability D-mark diplomacy to a more engaged role by supporting UN missions in Cambodia and Somalia. War in the Balkans forced Germany to make choices that would have been inconceivable ten years earlier: by 1994, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had cleared the way for German peacekeepers in Bosnia (SFOR), and in spring 1999 German soldiers "went to war" in support of NATO operations in Kosovo. Schöllgen paints the Schröder/Fischer decision to support NATO in a favorable light: if German pledges that Auschwitz must never reoccur ("Nie wieder Auschwitz") were to have real meaning, then Germany would have to contribute when called upon. The final two chapters of the book turn to the heart of Schöllgen's analysis, addressing why Germany led the way in opposing U.S. efforts to coerce Iraq in the summer of 2002; how Germany, France, and Russia combined to impede U.S. initiatives; and offering recommendations for the future course of German-American relations.

Schöllgen's volume falls more in the category of a thought piece and essay than a heavily documented and fully developed monograph. Those seeking new "insider" material will be disappointed, while Schöllgen's light documentation makes the piece ill-suited as a guide to literature and scholarship on the topics he addresses. But taken in the spirit of an essay, the work is engaging and provocative. For Schöllgen, German opposition to the Bush administration's Iraq policies represents more than the passing disagreement over how best to confront a common problem. Instead, it represents a natural realignment of the international order. With the passing of the Soviet threat, Schöllgen predicts that German and European interests will increasingly clash with those of the United States. NATO served its purpose, and the submerged differences between Germany and the United States will now surface anew. Grievances and disagreements are the centerpiece of Schöllgen's portrayal of the German-American relationship. He reminds his readers that every German administration from Adenauer's to Schröder's was "sooner or later filled with rage at the rude tone of command, the pushy power-diplomacy, the inconsiderate manner in which Bonn respectively Berlin was continuously confronted with fait accomplis" by the Americans (p. 110). Schöllgen notes that the Bush administration's unilateral tendencies, its refusal to sign the Kyoto Climate Protocol, its termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and its refusal to join the International Criminal Court help explain why Schröder's assertive foreign policy resonated among the German public. But for Schöllgen, Germany will have to free itself from American tutelage for reasons that go beyond these issues. Whether under Republicans or Democrats, Schöllgen contends that the White House has paid scant attention to German or European interests in its foreign and security policies over the last forty years. He greets Germany's "return to the world stage" as a positive development, carefully avoiding the call to confront the United States but advocating that Europe needs to increase its capabilities and coordinate its policies so that Europe and America can be equal partners.

Schöllgen's essay invites deliberation and debate at multiple levels. Given its realist undertones emphasizing security interests, power, and the nation state, the essay tends to conflate German and European interests as one and the same. Yet Europe's response to the Iraq crisis indicates that a common European foreign and security policy remains a goal rather than a reality, and other European states may not share Schöllgen's enthusiasm for Germany taking the lead in promoting and defining Europe's interests. More unsettling, Schöllgen dismisses talk of shared values and common identities as mere mirages, quoting Chancellor Kiesinger's word of caution from the 1960s: "American foreign policy in Europe serves the exclusive purpose of promoting American interests. Some Germans believe that friendship and helping friends are considerations. They are always sadly surprised later" (p. 129). Is this a fair and impartial view of the trans-Atlantic relationship? Did the United States only pursue its own narrow security interests in supporting German unification at a time when France, Britain, and the Soviet Union looked at the prospect with skepticism or even alarm? Dismissing fifty years of German-American cooperation and friendship as a security arrangement void of norms and values and based solely on a common, now defunct, threat seems overly simplistic. And given Europe's reluctance to invest in the capabilities that would allow it to protect itself in a dangerous age, Schöllgen's eagerness to jettison the Atlantic relationship seems premature.

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Citation: Douglas Peifer. Review of Schöllgen, Gregor, Der Auftritt: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne. H-German, H-Net Reviews. July, 2004.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9598

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