Thomas U. Berger. Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. xiii + 256 pp. $48.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8018-5820-8; $25.00 (paper), ISBN 978-0-8018-7238-9.

Reviewed by E. N. Peterson (Department of History, University of Wisconsin-River Falls)
Published on H-German (February, 2004)

Thomas Berger has provided a well-organized model of comparative history, demonstrating a command of languages and scholarly literature in both countries, as well as that of the relevant research on the United States. Rather than finding explanations for this phenomenon in some supposed "national character," as has been done so often, he finds the persuasive explanation in the West German and Japanese experiences during World War II and the early Cold War. Both nations suffered war, defeat and American Occupation; both shared a fear of the Soviet Union and necessary dependence on the United States. The complexity of personalities, pressures and compromises are presented in a comprehensible chronological order. What makes the logical structure of the book interesting is how the common theme of anti-militarism developed so differently in each country under ever-changing circumstances.

Berger presents a remarkable documentation of these two quite different cultures, one European and the other Asian, which experienced varying political pressures, but which agreed to remain demilitarized and unaggressive. His study analyzes both nations, their political leaders and parties, elite points of view in publications, and popular views from public opinion polls. The useful core concept that holds Berger's comparison together is that of consistent opposition to expenditure and preparation for war due to the lack of elite or popular support for "national defense." The other common theme is the more familiar story of how the United States, after briefly demanding that both enemy countries surrender their "militaristic" nature forever, consistently pushed and pulled both new allies back toward militarism in the Cold War.

Berger emphasizes, as do most American accounts, the effects of the American occupation as the origin of antimilitarism. My now ancient study, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (1977) stressed instead internal pressures, reaction to the destruction of the cities and the slaughter of a generation of men. I concluded that the war, not the occupation, taught that generation of Germans (and I assume the Japanese) to mistrust the use of armies to solve problems, just as it taught Americans to trust armies to bring them "victory."

The points of Berger's comparisons are integrated within each chapter, rather than being discussed in separate, parallel chapters. Readers seeking a short, relatively straightforward political history of each country could locate that in the book as well, although the book moves forward more by dominant personalities than by precise decades. In the process of comparison the author was able to clarify and explain the policy of each nation, although it takes a reader with some flexibility to make the leap around the world precipitously in mid-chapter. It is difficult to decide which half he does better, although as a Germanist, I found the German half the more subtly instructive. The book's strength seems to lie in the accurate and objective detail of decision-making, rather than its political science-sociological endeavor at a theoretical basis. Its contribution is in its tireless analysis of the coming and going of prime ministers and their variation on the common theme of avoiding militarism.

A further wealth of the book derives from its decade-by-decade collection of opinion polls for each country. They provide a presumably scientific basis for the author's conclusion about popular support for the policies adopted and the strong impact of such sentiment on politicians. Interestingly, Berger avoids the terminology "left wing" and "right wing" with the concepts of "right idealists" and "left idealists." In Germany, this distinction played out in arguments between the "Atlanticists," those stressing the alliance with NATO and the United States (Adenauer) vs. the "Central Europeanists," who sought to improve relations with East Europe (Brandt), even if that included the communist "enemy."

German anti-militarism was not similar to the Japanese phenomenon in every respect. Among the differences was the German political decision to build an internal democratization (Innere Fuehrung) into the Bundeswehr, a decision which Berger takes quite seriously, in comparison with the Japanese decision to accompany every amplification of Self Defense Force status with additional bureaucratic restraints.

Berger's book stresses similarities between the circumstances of these two cultures of anti-militarism. Some strong historical contrasts, however, might have been emphasized as well. For example, in Japan, the crippling threat to Japanese democracy in the 1930s came directly from the officers, whereas in Germany, the army's negativism toward democracy was quite secondary to the political threat to democratic government that came from the Nazi Party. The German military, despite or because of the Prussian Junker tradition, was less dangerous than the samurai.

Contrasts between the two examples might also have been found in the relationship of the military towards the political leadership. In Germany, the only viable threat to Hitler came from the military, some of whose members tried repeatedly to kill him. On the other hand, the Japanese military had often taken matters into its own hands and succeeded in killing opponents, but in contrast to the efforts of the German military to end the war, military efforts in Japan typically moved in the direction of more, not less, war.

Berger essentially ignores other significant differences: the supposed Japanese absolute loyalty to the emperor as divine, as well as the recent argumentation that Hirohito played an, active, sinister role in war planning, and that his supporters continued to do so after the war. Germany had eliminated its emperor previously, and instead elected presidents, most of whom were clearly at least as anti-militaristic as the more powerful chancellors.

While the political comparisons of the research are effectively made, Berger's analysis becomes less clear when the author turns to a "culture" of anti-militarism, but continues to focus on politics. While "culture" is a core concept of sociology, it is not clear why "the enduring preference for demilitarization" would not have been a more precise conceptualization. In treating the matter of culture, the author might also have profitably explored the question of how the abhorrence of militarism in both countries has been passed to the grandchildren of soldiers who suffered at the front, and civilians who suffered the bombing of the home front. This transfer occurred despite the fact that physical reminders of the war were rather quickly removed. Reminders of economic privation were also kept alive, but mostly as part of family reminiscences. Reminiscences also affected the millions of Germans who had lost everything by being expelled from their ancestral lands. They might have had reasons to consider another war, but did not dare to wish for one.

Even political comparisons of the two nations' experiences might have been made more stringently, however. For instance, more might have been made of the fact that Japan entered the Cold War united and Germany divided. West Germany had three occupiers and Japan only one. Post-war political circumstances in each country were also different; Berger might have examined the difference between the long-standing near one-party LDP regime in Japan, in contrast to the two-party alternation in West Germany, with the FDP tipping the policy balance and thus serving to correct the government by its departure from coalitions when the majority party had become overly-fixed in a particular policy direction.

In comparing the foreign policies of each country, Berger makes rather little mention of the tensions working upon Japan in Germany in maintaining the U.S. alliance during the long Vietnam War. Interestingly, the book suggests that the Reagan revival of the Cold War elicited more opposition than did the Vietnam War. Still, it might be argued that Japan had a greater threat to the antimilitarism that was a condition of the U.S. alliance from its neighbors, Communist China and North Korea, while Germany's neighbors were mostly friendly, capitalist countries. Ultimately, the United States fought a war to resist the threat in Korea, something that was not necessary in Europe. Berger might also have considered the effect of the re-militarization of South Korea, which took place simultaneously with the demilitarization in Japan.

Finally, it would have been useful to consider the historic, cultural, even biological, connection of Germany to its neighbors and the United States, a state of affairs that was not the case for Japan. The pop culture ties to Anglo-America played a significant role in the continued antimilitarism of Germany--but since such ties were lacking in Japan prior to the war (beyond the persistent love of baseball), the Japanese loyalty to its post-war alliance is all the more remarkable.

Despite these omissions, the explanation of antimilitarism in the two societies before 1989 is credible. Admittedly, Berger's explanations are sometimes complex and strained. The simpler conclusion would be that peoples who experience the horrors of war and defeat as brutally as Germans and Japanese did will resist the siren call of patriotism and re-militarization.

The book's effort to follow policy into the post-Cold War era is somewhat less impressive. Berger's judgments about the impact of the first Gulf War seem less sure, particularly the postulation of a "white hot intensity" (p. 177) if the Germans and Japanese had not made significant (even if non-military) contributions.

At any rate, the Japanese and German consistency in their support of peace has remained constant for over half a century. Hence the Bush administration's anger at the "cowardice" of Germany and France in 2003 is a supreme irony, considering that German antimilitarism was a concrete goal of the post-1945 allied occupation of Germany. Political circumstance and US pressure have had their effects. Although the German government has avoided Iraq like the plague, it loyally sent troops to Bosnia for Clinton and the more dangerous Afghanistan for George W. Bush. The news in November 2003 that seven hundred Japanese troops would be sent to a relatively secure part of Iraq showed how pressure from the Bush administration had finally broken through the "culture" of Japanese anti-militarism.

One might speculate that an unconditional defeat is necessary to persuade the masses of the folly of war, but that is a terrible way to learn the lesson. A limited defeat, as in Vietnam, apparently did not suffice.

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Citation: E. N. Peterson. Review of Berger, Thomas U., Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. H-German, H-Net Reviews. February, 2004.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=8851

Copyright © 2004 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication, originating list, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews editorial staff at hbooks@mail.h-net.org.