H. David Stone, Jr. Vital Rails: The Charleston & Savannah Railroad and the Civil War in Coastal South Carolina. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008. xiii + 369 pp. $39.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-57003-716-0.

Reviewed by Lisa Denmark (Department of History, Georgia Southern University)
Published on H-Southern-Industry (July, 2008)

Lumbering to the Defense of the Lowcountry

In Vital Rails, H. David Stone, Jr. combines his love of history, an interest in genealogy, and a fascination with railroads. The result is a work that reminds readers that the Confederacy fought the Civil War on many fronts and used a variety of strategies to combat Federal military invasion. Theatres like Virginia and the West and battles like Gettysburg and Shiloh captured the greatest headlines then and now. Yet, there were other theatres, other battles, and other struggles. Stone writes about the importance of a railroad far away from the war's major fronts and cities, but which was no less important to those who used it for supply and defense.

The Charleston & Savannah Railroad was a recent addition to the lines emanating from Savannah and Charleston. Chartered in 1854, it was intended to benefit the commercial interests of both traditional rival cities, though Charleston needed the connection more than Savannah. Promoters envisioned this new line through the lowcountry would become part of a larger system of railroads running from New York to Norfolk and eventually to Pensacola.

Like most railroads, the Charleston & Savannah confronted numerous obstacles in procuring sufficient capital and an efficient, feasible route. Investment always fell short of both expectations and needs. While some planters were eager for the new railroad and demanded the rail line traverse their districts, other "tideland gentry" wanted nothing to do with it (p. 26). Some towns were so antagonistic they passed ordinances to prevent the line from coming into their limits. Others, seeking a more immediate profit from the railroad, demanded exorbitant right-of-way payments.

In the first three chapters of the work, Stone intricately details the controversy over location, difficulties with construction through the swamp, problems with procuring material, and constant funding shortfalls. Ironically, the company had an easier time securing its terminus in Savannah than it did in Charleston. It worked out an agreement with Savannah's Central Railroad to use part of its line as well as its depot in Savannah. For various reasons, primarily lack of funding for a bridge, the initial Charleston terminus was on the south bank of the Ashley River opposite the city. Stone says the decision to temporarily forgo a route into the city was at best "a little shortsighted" (p. 23). Throughout the rest of the work, he reminds the reader how this decision came back to haunt both the company and the Confederacy.

Although locomotives were first put into service in 1858, the entire line was not complete until November 1860. As William Freehling notes in volume 2 of Road to Disunion, timing, chance, and coincidence "crossed the path of the long-term sectional controversy," to propel the United States into the disaster of secession and Civil War.[1] Possibly none of these was more important in pushing South Carolina over the brink into an early secession in November 1860 than Charleston's celebration of its new domestic Southern enterprise. As the fire-eaters began to fear they would lose the passions sparked by Lincoln's election, the Charleston & Savannah Railroad, carrying assurances of Georgia's backing, steamed to the rescue. Though this interpretation is not new, Stone rightly refers to this coupling of events as "one of the defining moments of the Southern secession movement" (p. 44).

As the rest of the nation careened over the brink into civil war, Charleston & Savannah executives, many of them at least moderate secessionists, had nevertheless built the line right in the heart of secessionist sentiment. They did not, however, plan for the eventuality of wartime use of the railroad. Yet even before the outbreak of hostilities, during the initial crisis over the Federal occupation of Fort Sumter, the Charleston & Savannah Railroad demonstrated its importance in connecting an isolated Charleston to the outside world.

From the earliest stages of the conflict, railroad executives had to balance the contradictory goals of running a company for financial gain and allowing Confederate authorities a sufficient level of control over a strategic military asset. Although directors demonstrated their patriotism by agreeing to freight and passenger rates set by the military, they quickly discovered that secession and war were not conducive to the profitable operation of a railroad. The company's primary goal was making money, but it had to balance this acquisitive nature with the military necessity of defending the lowcountry. As Stone notes, the railroad and the military needed each other. This symbiotic relationship, however, did not preclude clashes over the primary and proper use of the railroad.

Stone spends the next nine chapters covering the railroad within the context of war. Mundane fiscal matters and railroad conventions were interspersed with more serious financial and military crises, which became more common as a revolving door of presidents and directors came and went in rapid succession over the next four years. Many of those directly engaged in running the railroad, like Christopher Memminger, also became deeply involved in running the Confederate government, which consumed most of their time and energy. Stone manages to weave the various military threats to the lowcountry and the railroad's role in its defense throughout his work. At times the war fades far into the background, and the intricacies of company business take center stage. At other points, railroad business is sidetracked as the author meticulously details the various Union military attacks on Charleston and the railroad itself.

The fall of Port Royal in November 1861 demonstrated a growing weakness of the Confederacy and a flaw in its overall strategy. The Confederate military could not defend all of its territory, but as a matter of political necessity, it tried. The Charleston & Savannah Railroad became crucial to the lowcountry's defense and reflected the general strategy of the dispersed defensive.

If the Charleston & Savannah fell into Union hands, it would weaken the defense of both its terminal cities. To defend against a possible Union attack, General Robert E. Lee, commanding the newly created Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and East Florida, arrived in South Carolina a day after the Union victory at Port Royal. He used the advantage of the railroad's interior lines as the lynchpin of the lowcountry's defense. Small detachments of troops guarded the most vulnerable points in the line. Should an attack occur, they would be able to sound the alarm. Although this strategy risked possible breakthrough, as long as the Charleston & Savannah Railroad was operational, it could and did concentrate troops at any point of attack. Though Stone's study adds little to existing interpretations of this theatre and fails to put it into the context of the Confederacy's overall dispersed defensive strategy, it does highlight the importance of the Charleston & Savannah Railroad to the overall defense of the lowcountry, particularly as a target of attack and the primary means of defense. When Union forces tested Confederate lines, both sides recognized the Charleston & Savannah as a valuable defensive asset and a means for the rapid deployment of troops. Stone notes the railroad's contributions to the defense of Charleston and the successful defense of Fort Wagner.

Defending the lowcounty became increasingly complicated as the Confederacy drained men and supplies from the region to bolster vulnerable and valuable points elsewhere. Stone blames Jefferson Davis for at best not understanding railroad needs, and at worst for ignoring his obligation to the railroads. Although Stone may overreach in his criticism of the Confederate president, Davis clearly subordinated railroad demands for higher rates, skilled men, fuel, and other necessary material to military needs. Stone also notes the abuse railroad equipment suffered at the hands of careless soldiers, the wear the railroad experienced as a result of the military overloading passenger capacity, and the loss of profits due to the need to keep locomotives ready to aid the military should the alarm be sounded. The Charleston & Savannah Railroad managed to evacuate its rolling stock before Sherman took Savannah and again when Charleston fell. However, the company's luck ran out when it chose Cheraw, South Carolina, as its safe haven. Cheraw, it turned out, fell right in the path of Sherman's army as it marched from Columbia and much of the company's rolling stock and equipment was destroyed.

Stone concludes his work with two chapters detailing the postwar experience of the debt-ridden and struggling company. Not long after the war, it was sold at auction and reorganized as the Savannah & Charleston Railroad. Once again wiped out by the panic of 1873, it was sold and ultimately integrated into the larger system assembled by railroad mogul Henry B. Plant. Plant ultimately fulfilled the original plans of the Charleston & Savannah Railroad's promoters, though the final product was run for the benefit of the Plant system rather than Charleston interests.

The South's railroad construction on the eve of war paled compared to the North's. Yet, in spite of crippling shortages, these Southern railroads enabled the Confederacy to survive longer than a nation without them. In this work, Stone has added to our understanding of the vital role one particular railroad played in this four-year saga. His intense focus on a single railroad and its participation in the lowcountry does occasion some problems with contextualization. The larger war matters only insomuch as it impacts the Charleston & Savannah. Stone's hefty reports of railroad meetings are informative, if at times tedious. In his analysis of the numerous battles and skirmishes in which the railroad was involved, he derails the narrative to discuss various counterfactuals. These minor concerns aside, Vital Rails provides readers with an interesting glimpse into the workings of a railroad forced to cope with financial and military crises beyond its control.

Note

[1]. William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Volume II: Secessionists Triumphant 1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 424-425.

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Citation: Lisa Denmark. Review of Stone, H. David, Jr., Vital Rails: The Charleston & Savannah Railroad and the Civil War in Coastal South Carolina. H-Southern-Industry, H-Net Reviews. July, 2008.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=14711

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