Dominik Geppert, ed. The Postwar Challenge, 1945-1958. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. ix + 390 pp. $155.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-19-926665-4.

Reviewed by Alexander Peter d'Erizans (Department of Social Science, Borough of Manhattan Community College (CUNY))
Published on H-German (January, 2006)

A World in Flux

In recent years, scholars have sought to uncover the manner in which World War II shaped post-1945 Europe. They have not only devoted considerable attention to political institutional changes, economic development, and Allied concerns as victors and occupiers, but, with the burgeoning interest in cultural history and memory studies, have also wrestled with ways societies and individuals gave "meaning" to what had happened through remembrance and commemoration. In attempting to understand postwar transitions, historians have scrutinized the traditional notion of a Stunde Null in order to indicate more precisely changes and continuities in experiences, attitudes, and mentalities.[1] For the most part, however, these studies have remained rooted in national paradigms.[2] Growing out of an international conference in 2001 sponsored by the German Historical Institute in London, this volume enhances understanding of European postwar historical developments by deploying a comparative, transnational methodology in conjunction with a more traditional national perspective. The contributors acknowledge that national traditions and war experiences shaped much postwar development. Nonetheless, they stress how European societies, especially after 1945, were not isolated from each other. On the contrary, they were deeply intertwined through individual and institutional contacts as well as the transfer of goods, services, and ideas.

The contributors focus on the thirteen years between the fall of Berlin (1945) and the Treaties of Rome (1958), a vital period in which Europe developed from a war-ravaged continent heavily affected by dictatorial governments to a relatively peaceful, prosperous, and democratic region. The contributors argue that the increasing political stability and economic prosperity of the immediate postwar period provided for much of Europe's transition to the pluralistic, talent-oriented, consumer-driven society of the present. The volume compares key developmental processes in the postwar societies of the four largest Western European nations--Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany. Despite similar sizes and common development of capitalist economies and parliamentary democracies, these nations differed from each other profoundly in terms of wartime victory, governmental organizations, impact of federalism, and the importance of agriculture.

The volume is divided into four sections. The first asks how these nations "came to terms" with their recent history. Norbert Frei asserts that an attitude of Vergangenheitspolitik set in following the FRG's creation. From 1945 to 1949, the Allies pursued a concerted policy of purging, but subsequently, the FRG implemented an essentially opposite strategy via "amnesty," "integration," and "demarcation" (the attempt to separate itself from the Nazi regime). To some extent, this anti-Nazi posture attempted to fulfill Allied expectations. Still, West German leaders genuinely wished to stabilize their anti-Nazi consensus in government. Not until the end of the 1950s did a more critical approach to the Nazi past ultimately emerge, and in the 1960s German courts began to pursue Nazi criminals. Italy also grappled with its war experience. Filippo Focardi shows how a collective memory of World War II developed in this nation. Presenting the process as a battle between competing histories, he argues that between 1943 and 1947, Italian anti-fascists won out. Their narrative highlighted Italian "suffering," arguing that genuine Italian sentiments revealed themselves only after the 1943 armistice in a "heroic" struggle against Nazi Germany. Even after the anti-fascist coalition disbanded, this narrative remained the dominant form of collective memory. In his contribution, Pieter Lagrou investigates French memory of the war, critically analyzing the recent "revisionist" argument on French recollections (which emphasizes popular support for the Vichy regime, the limited scope of postwar purges, and postwar France's reinvention of itself as a nation of unified resistance fighters). Lagrou points out that this revisionist narrative privileges Gaullist and Communist commemorations, both marginal political groups between 1946 and 1958. Triumphalism, however, was not the dominant popular mood in the immediate postwar years. Instead, Lagrou indicates that suffering and persecution were the most important components in French memory of World War II, particularly as the Fourth Republic wrestled with the conflict's social and demographic consequences. As Frei does for Germany, Lagrou posits that this French narrative of victimization provided for postwar stability in one of the most politically polarized and unstable European nations. The victorious British wrote a narrative of the war quite different from the other three cases. Nick Hewitt argues that official commemoration ultimately embraced all classes and parties. Nevertheless, generational differences proved an important dividing line. The soldiers mobilized in World War II, who Hewitt labels a "skeptical generation," rejected the grand style of World War I monuments in favor of "utilitarian" memorials (public swimming baths or subsidized housing for wounded veterans). A sense of shared participation in wartime hardships meant civilians felt less obligated to show their gratitude to the military publicly. The material costs of bombing bolstered the argument that money should be utilized for practical rather than symbolic commemoration. Only recently have World War II veterans forgotten their earlier misgivings and demanded the erection of structures to commemorate their victory over Nazism (following the younger generation's wishes).

Postwar efforts at "coping with the past" went hand in hand with future goals. The second section deals with national approaches to postwar economic and social restructuring. David Gilgen highlights concerns over the interwar world economic crisis and Nazi rule in the minds of German leaders across the political spectrum. Both major parties agreed that a new economic and political system should be judged according to its ability to prevent such catastrophes. Both the Christian and the Social Democrats initially demanded socialist measures (like state control of strategic industries, nationalization of raw material extraction, central planning, democracy, anti-Bolshevism, free choice of profession, and the strengthening of small and medium-sized production). Only after the summer of 1947 did the Christian Democrats behind Konrad Adenauer turn their backs on socialism to advocate a mixture of liberalism and welfare politics that epitomized the German social market economy. Jose Harris indicates that socialism was also a formidable force in immediate postwar Britain. Contesting a major trend in recent literature, which asserts that World War II did not fundamentally alter British government and society, Harris postulates that the ambitious ideas of "war socialism" garnered support from both the right and the left. In contrast to Germany, where Adenauer's CDU and Allied occupation hindered such efforts, Clement Atlee's Labor government in Britain implemented far-reaching reforms. In his study of France, Gerard Bossuat argues that defeat in 1940 and widespread collaboration convinced leaders of the need for a thorough modernization. The author shows the evolution and implementation of a "Franco-American modernization model," marked by interventionism, state socialism, and nationalizations, on the one hand, and an extensive program for improving workplace relations, balanced public finances, an export drive, material comfort for wage-earners, and technologically based performance on the other. Although U.S. financial aid was crucial to modernization, Bossuat ultimately emphasizes the French roots of these developments. For the Italian case, Luciano Segreto demonstrates how decisions outside Italy proved crucial in determining economic and monetary policy and overcoming domestic obstacles to reform: a powerful Communist Party, Vatican influence on policy, a weak state, traditional economic structures dominated by small family businesses, and the legacy of fascism in the form of state-controlled big enterprises. Prevailing over politicians and civil servants skeptical of a market economy, technocratic managers harnessed state power and adopted American notions of deregulation and free trade. Domestic opposition, however, ultimately inhibited genuine social reform.

In the third section, the authors enter debates on supranational integration in Europe. They reveal links between countries and the limits of the nation-state as an exclusive analytical focus. Three questions dominate the contributions in this part. First, the essays grapple with the extent of U.S. influence on debates in each country. Second, they address the motivation of the foreign policy elite. Did supranational idealism and the attempt to purge the continent of war and nationalist excesses dominate their thinking or were leaders primarily concerned with traditional notions of national interest? Finally, the essays deal with the nature of the federalist movements--their form, development and relative popularity.

Wilfried Loth highlights specifically German motives and goals in discussions about the European movement. He views the popularity of the movement for European unity as a reaction to postwar disorientation. The urge to regain state sovereignty, pursue self-restraint, and secure peace quickly became driving forces in West German policy. At first, two concepts of Europe prevailed in discussions--a socialist Europe as a "third force" between West and East that would prevent a third world war, against Adenauer's concept of western integration. Cold War tensions caused the adoption of Adenauer's vision. At least initially, however, this decision was more unpopular than its socialist counterpart because it abandoned Eastern Europe and the Soviet Zone, ignored the objective of preventing war, and abandoned efforts to secure the self-determination of all Germans. According to Elisabeth du Reau, national concerns and perceived threats to the state dominated French debates. Need for security against Germany and the Soviet Union was the key issue along with preservation of national sovereignty and self-determination. French support for a federalist vision therefore always remained limited. Although the federalist approach succeeded in the economic realm, it ultimately failed in the case of the European Defense Community (EDC), the "Ad Hoc Assembly" of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the Council of Europe. For the Italian case, Leopoldo Nuti highlights the importance of the United States in discussions of the European movement. He argues that Italian foreign policy was concerned with establishing intimate ties with the United States and securing American aid. The government was able to communicate this objective more easily via European rhetoric than discredited nationalist posturing. Ultimately, however, Nuti argues that the Italian foreign policy elite harnessed the concept of European integration only to cement relations with the United States. Despite British distance from discussions of European integration, Piers N. Ludlow nonetheless indicates the extent of British political and economic cooperation. He challenges the argument linking Britain's military and political wartime successes and its postwar reluctance to become involved in cooperative schemes. Although Britain refused to join the founding members of the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC), the author points out that Britain was nonetheless a founding member of Bretton Woods, the UN, GATT, and NATO. In the end, Ludlow does not abandon the "price of victory" thesis altogether, for he concedes that wartime experience bolstered the British tendency to highlight "global status" and the self-image of a heroic island nation repelling a hostile Europe.

In investigating the influence of the United States on the social and cultural reorganization of Western Europe, the fourth and final section moves away from the national paradigm altogether. Contributors here attempt to discern the balance between U.S. influence and independent European traditions. All argue that a critical study must address the particular areas of U.S. influence (economic, military, and cultural) as well as the various ways in which governments, private groups, and individuals exerted it. In his piece analyzing the impact of the European Recovery Program in all four nations, Carlo Spagnolo argues that the Marshall Plan was primarily a strategy to ensure American leadership in a new world order. For U.S. strategists, maintaining peace and securing liberal capitalism were inseparable, so economic and political stability were their principle aims. Europeans and Americans differed concerning key elements of postwar reconstruction: social ideals, the function of the state, and the role of individuals in postwar society--disagreements were so prevalent that the Marshall plan might have failed if not for common fear of the Soviet Union. Volker Berghahn shifts the discussion to the realm of culture, another "front" considered vital by both sides in the emerging cold war. He reveals a dramatic shift in U.S. cultural policy after the transition from the Truman to the Eisenhower government. The Republican administration fostered a more circumscribed role for official government channels of U.S. cultural policy, but CIA and private foundation funding gained importance. Berghahn concludes that American attempts to influence Western Europe continued despite assertions of cultural victory over the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s. Michael Hochgeschwender analyzes a concrete example of the U.S. cultural offensive with his discussion of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), an organization comprised of European and American intellectuals. Financed by the CIA, and later by the Ford Foundation, the group viewed the cold war as an intellectual conflict. CCF tailored policies to the nation it was operating in. In West Germany and Britain, with weak Communist parties, it focused on combating national "neutralism" or Communist "fellow-travelers." It also sought to shift the SPD and the Labor Party away from left-wing dogmatism by facilitating transatlantic communications with reform-oriented U.S. liberals. In France and Italy, CCF challenged the intellectual influence of the Communists, anti-American prejudices and stereotypes, and the influence of Roman Catholicism. Dominik Geppert's essay directs our attention to the history of the so-called "freedom bell." The initiators of Radio Free Europe (RFE) commissioned a foundry to cast a bell resembling the Philadelphia Liberty Bill, which was used to raise funds for RFE's "Crusade for Freedom." Finally, in October 1950, it arrived in Berlin where it was ceremonially placed in the belfry of Rathaus Schöneberg, symbolically transferring the "spirit of America" to Berlin. Geppert analyzes not only the people and institutions responsible for the project, but also its rhetoric of "freedom versus tyranny." Like CCF, the bell used anti-totalitarian language to rally support for the struggle against Communism. Still, while CCF initially focused its activities in France, Italy, and Britain, RFE strategized in Germany and the Eastern bloc. While CCF targeted the intellectual and cultural elite by organizing conferences, exhibitions, and seminars, and publishing "highbrow" magazines, RFE conducted "grass-roots" campaigns to mobilize as many people as possible. While CCF supporters tended to be more urban and cosmopolitan, those who rallied behind the "Crusade" were more drawn to the traditional and religious aspects of American propaganda efforts. Toby Thacker discusses yet another "front" of the cultural war in his investigation of the introduction of American music to Germany. He scrutinizes U.S. efforts to popularize American concert music via performances, broadcast recordings, articles, and lecture tours. Thacker reminds us of the United States' concerted efforts to combat anti-Americanism among European elites. In the short term, deep-rooted anti-American prejudices and feelings of cultural superiority in Germany permitted American cultural diplomats only limited success. In the long run, however, as part of a scheme of the FRG's cultural "reorientation" to the wider Atlantic community and the creation of democratic institutions, efforts to introduce American music to Germany were overwhelmingly successful.

Divided into four clearly discernible and organized sections, this volume offers clear insight into Western Europe's struggle with the repercussions of an uneasy past, the fragmentation of a chaotic present, and the dilemmas of an uncertain future. Throughout, contributors reveal the period between the end of World War II and the Treaties of Rome as a time of relative possibility, a period of fluidity and flux before the fronts of the cold war truly hardened. Although they concede that complete Allied victory over the Axis powers marked a genuine change in the circumstances under which policy was conducted in the countries under scrutiny, they nonetheless challenge the very notion of a Stunde Null by indicating how the legacies of the interwar period as well as the experience of World War II loomed large in the minds of postwar elites and government policies. The essays provide a better understanding of the extent and dynamics of U.S. power in Western Europe in the immediate postwar period. Utilizing a comparative, transnational approach, the contributors are able to indicate just how important national differences truly were in the face of common challenges. Future research could only enhance these investigations by discerning the often hidden popular sentiments concerning the past, present, and future that unexpectedly articulated themselves only in everyday social practices. Such insight into daily life could shed more light on how local voices and events on the "ground" contributed to and perhaps even shaped political, economic, social, and cultural changes taking place nationally and internationally amidst the many ambiguities of a post-1945 world.

Notes

[1]. For Germany, see Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller, eds., Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988); Geoffrey J. Giles, ed., Stunde Null: The End and the Beginning Fifty Years Ago (Washington: German Historical Institute, 1997).

[2]. Two recent notable exceptions are Bernd A. Rusinek, Kriegsende 1945: Verbrechen, Katastrophen, Befreiungen in nationaler und internationaler Perspektive (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004); Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, eds., Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s (Washington: German Historical Institute, 2003).

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Citation: Alexander Peter d'Erizans. Review of Geppert, Dominik, ed., The Postwar Challenge, 1945-1958. H-German, H-Net Reviews. January, 2006.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11351

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